The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily re ect those of the Bank of England. We thank Lina El-Jahel References  26  Tables  28  Charts  38 Abstract To measure the risks involved in their trading operations, major banks are increasingly employing Value-at-Risk VaR models. In an important regulatory innovation, the Basle Committee has proposed that such models be used in the determination of the capital that banks must hold to back their securities trading. This paper examines the empirical performance of di erent V aR models using data on the actual xed income, foreign exchange and equity security holdings of a large bank. We examine how a bank applying the models would have fared in the past if the proposed rules had been in operation.
1 Introduction
Trading risk and the Basle Accord
In the last decade, banks have greatly increased their holdings of trading assets such as bonds, equities, interest rate and equity derivatives, foreign exchange and commodity positions. Their motive i n this has been to make trading pro ts and to hedge exposures elsewhere in their banking portfolios. The swap market has been especially important in enabling banks to raise funds in a wider range of markets while avoiding mismatched portfolios.
The increase in the relative importance of trading risk in bank portfolios has obliged regulators to reconsider the system of capital requirements agreed in the 1988 Basle Capital Accord. The common framework for treating risk laid down by the 1988 Accord was designed primarily for limiting credit risk and had clear drawbacks in its treatment of trading risk. For example, short positions and holdings of government securities were not covered. The capital charge imposed by the 1988 Accord was a minimum of 8 of private sector assets regardless of maturity and made no allowance for the volatility of di erent security prices. Thus, low-risk short-maturity private sector bonds were penalized much more than longer-dated corporate debt. In certain markets, this placed banks at a competitive disadvantage compared to securities rms for whom capital requirements, at least in the United Kingdom and United States, allow for such risk in a more sophisticated way.
These problems led the European Commission and the Basle Supervisors' Committee to study alternative w ays of treating trading book positions. The Commission's Capital Adequacy Directive CAD, agreed in 1993 and introduced at the beginning of 1996, established EU minimum capital requirements for the trading books of banks and securities rms. The Basle Committee proposals are summarised in a paper issued in January 1996 entitled,`Overview of the Amendment o f the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks.' This and earlier papers issued by the Committee 2 propose a system comprising two alternative w ays of calculating trading book capital. Commercial banks would themselves decide whether they wished to be regulated under the so-called`standardised' or the`alternative' model proposed by Basle. G10 supervisory authorities are to implement the two approaches by end 1997. 3 
Additive capital requirements
The CAD and the Basle standardised approach are very similar. Heavily in uenced by the systems of capital requirements operated by United Kingdom and United States securities regulators, both systems require rms to hold capital equivalent to a percentage of its holdings in di erent asset categories, where the percentages are chosen to re ect the price volatilities of generic assets in the relevant categories.
An important drawback of both CAD and the Basle standardised approach i s t h e additive nature of the capital required for broad asset categories. 4 The requirement is calculated market by market for equity, foreign exchange FX and interest rate risk, and then these separate requirements are summed. Thus, for example, the capital requirement for a long position in United Kingdom equities takes into account hedging in the same market but not, say, a n y o set from holding a short position in United States equities. Nor does it take i n to account the bene ts of diversi cation from holding long positions in both markets. 5 The e ect is to favour specialised market-makers at the expense of globally diversi ed banks. Banks that run global portfolios have, therefore, pressed the Basle Committee to consider approaches to 2 See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 1995a and 1995b. 3 Jackson 1995 and Kupiec and O'Brien 1995 discuss risk measurement in the context of bank regulation. 4 Dimson and Marsh 1995 discuss at length the implications of the building-block approach. 5 The United Kingdom securities regulators address this problem for equity positions by using a simpli ed Sharpe portfolio model but this approach w as not adopted by either CAD or Basle. capital requirements that do recognise the bene ts of diversi cation. Clearly, a c hieving this in a regime in which the supervisors set the percentage capital requirements and hedging allowances for di erent types of position would have been extremely complex. But, the rms had themselves been developing methods of measuring the risk of given losses on their total portfolio and these internal whole-book or Value at Risk VaR models have provided a way of making the problem tractable. 6 Hence, it was possible to develop an alternative to the Basle standardised approach.
The Basle Alternative Approach
In the Basle`alternative approach', rather than laying down the percentage capital requirements for di erent exposures, regulators would establish standards for banks' in-house risk models. These models would then form the basis for the calculation of capital requirements. This would have the key additional advantage of aligning the capital calculation with the risk measurement approach of the particular rm.
Using internal models to generate capital requirements is a radical change in approach but supervisors have for some time been moving steadily in this direction. In the CAD and the Basle standardised method, it is recognised that only by employing the rms' internal models can some positions be correctly processed for inclusion in the capital calculation. This is particularly the case for options, but sensitivity models designed to convert large books of swaps into equivalent bond exposures and to assess the risk on foreign exchange books were also allowed.
It does, however, raise a number of issues for supervisors concerning the safeguards which should be put in place to ensure that the capital requirements generated are adequate. Basle has addressed this in several ways. One is to lay d o wn standards for the construction of the models. For example, they must calculate the distribution of losses over 6 A systematic description of di erent approaches to VaR may be found in Jackson 1995. The June 1996 special issue of Risk Magazine provides various practitioner perspectives on VaR. a ten-day holding period using at least twelve months of data and must yield capital requirements su cient t o c o ver losses on 99 of occasions.
Adopting general standards is necessary both to increase consistency between banks and to ensure that capital requirements really are adequate to the task. In theory, h o wever, they might drive a w edge between the regulatory model and the one which the rm uses for its own purposes. Typically the rms' VaR models use a 95 con dence interval and a 24-hour holding period. Basle will not, however, prescribe the type of model to be used.
Regulatory safeguards
A s a c heck on the accuracy of the models, under the proposed alternative Basle approach, the supervisors will carry out back-testing, the comparison of actual trading results with model-generated risk measures. This may pose problems, rst because trading results are often a ected by c hanges in portfolios in the period following the calculation of the VaR. Because of this, Basle has urged banks to develop the capability to perform back-tests using the losses which would have been made if the book had been held constant o ver a one-day period. Second, Kupiec 1995 argues that back-testing requires a large number of observations in order to make a judgment about the accuracy of the model. Nevertheless, back-testing and some kind of penalty are essential to provide incentives for rms to increase the accuracy of the models. The Basle proposals envisage that rms that do not meet the back-testing criterion for accuracy should su er additional capital charges.
As well as back-testing, the system would include the safeguard of an over-riding multiplier. More precisely, Basle is proposing that the capital requirement should be equivalent to the higher of i the current V aR estimate and ii the average VaR estimate over the previous 60 days multiplied by three. The incorporation of a multiplier has the advantage of making the system more conservative without distorting the treatment of trading books with di erent risk pro les. However, if the multiplier is too high, it could discourage rms from developing in-house models and lead them to select the standardised rather than the alternative approach since, as mentioned above, banks themselves are to be free to choose which they adopt.
Value-at-Risk analysis
What then is the nature of the`whole-book' or VaR models that will be used in capital requirement calculations by banks that take the Basle Committee's alternative approach? The typical VaR models developed by the rms for their internal risk-management purposes attempt to measure the loss on a portfolio over a speci ed period often the next 24 hours that will only be exceeded on a given fraction of occasions typically 1 or 5. Two broad types of VaR analysis are employed.
First, under parametric VaR analysis, the distribution of asset returns is estimated from historical data under the assumption that this distribution is a member of a given parametric class. The commonest procedure is to suppose that returns are stationary, joint normal and independent o ver time. Using estimates of the means and covariances of returns, one may calculate the daily loss that will be exceeded with a given probability. Second, the simulation approach t o V aR analysis consists of nding, from a long run of historical data, the loss that is exceeded on a given percentage of the days in the sample. As a non-parametric procedure, the latter imposes no distributional assumptions.
7
In this paper, we examine various aspects of VaR analysis and its use as an instrument of banking regulation from an empirical point o f view.
8
Using data on the equity, i n terest and FX rate exposure of a bank with signi cant trading activity, w e compare the empirical performance of parametric and simulation-based VaR analysis. Even The terminology used to distinguish these two forms of VaR analysis varies across authors in a somewhat confusing manner. For example, Laycock and Paxson 1995 refer to what we call parametric and simulation-based VaRs as simulation and backtesting approaches respectively. The former is also often referred to as the variancecovariance approach.
A signi cant omission in our study is that we do not study the treatmentof derivatives in VaR models. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 1994 discusses some of the problems involved in the risk management of derivatives portfolios. Estrella 1995 argues that the standard approach of linearising non-linear claims such a s options can cause problems. though the proposed Basle Accord Amendment does not specify which approach banks should use, the penalties envisaged for banks whose models fail to forecast loss probabilities accurately makes this an important question. We also look at the impact of window length ie, the length of returns data used and weighting factors for the returns. The alternative Basle system requires the use of at least one year of data, and we assess whether this appears sensible.
A nding of considerable practical signi cance is that adopting di erent approaches to estimating return volatility for reasonably well-diversi ed xed income portfolios makes little di erence to the degree to which one can forecast risk. The techniques one employs in calculating volatility can a ect forecasting accuracy in a statistically signi cant w ay but the improvements are not substantial enough to be economically signi cant. On the other hand, the various approaches to VaR modelling di er widely in the accuracy with which they predict the fraction of times a given loss will be exceeded. If this latter criterion is applied, simulation-based rather than parametric VaR techniques appear preferable.
Last, we i n vestigate the precise formula for required capital proposed in the Basle alternative approach. As mentioned above, the current proposal is that capital must exceed the maximum of i the previous day's VaR, or ii three times the average VaR of the previous 60 days. It is interesting to ask with our`real life' books, how the scaling factor and the fact that one must take the maximum of two quantities a ect the outcome.
Empirical analysis of VaRs

Trading books
In this section, we compare the performance of simulation-based VaR methods with parametric VaR analysis that assumes joint normality o f asset return distributions. In evaluating di erent V aR techniques, we employ data on the trading book of a bank with signi cant trading exposure. From these data, 9 provided to us on condition of anonymity, one may deduce the amounts held by the bank in a number of asset categories. The asset breakdown consists of 14 maturitỳ buckets' ie, intervals along the yield curve for ve di erent government bond markets United Kingdom, United States, Japan, Germany and France. The time buckets comprise four bands for maturities less than one year, annual bands for one to ten-year maturities, and a single band for maturities greater than ten years. Table A shows the break-down of the four di erent books that we employed in our statistical analysis. The rst three portfolios were those held by the bank on three consecutive months. In the table, the foreign exchange exposure for a particular currency represents the total net sterling value of assets denominated in that currency. Hence, for example, if the bank acquires a ten-year Deutsche Mark-denominated bond, both the FX exposure and the six to ten-year bond categories in the Deutche Mark column of Table A increase.
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Two features of the data stand out. First, the degree to which the bank's xed income exposure uctuates over relatively short periods of time is quite striking. This fact underlines the importance of banks satisfying capital requirements for market risk almost on a continuous basis. Thus, VaR models need to be run daily. Second, the bank's net foreign exchange FX exposure is small except for the large short United States dollar position in portfolio 4. This suggests that the bank is systematically hedging the net FX risk in its trading book.
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Other data in our possession suggest that the months we c hose were fairly typical of the bank's general behaviour in that FX risk is systematically hedged while other exposures uctuate considerably.
The main advantage of using actual books for the predominant bank trading risks is that it ensures that the pattern of risk exposures along the yield curve and between markets is realistic. The amount o f exposure taken at di erent points on the yield curve and between 9 The data consisted of sensitivities of the di erent assets in the book to given market movements. 10 The practice of considering the exchange rate and foreign currency price risks separately is common among practitioners. 11 The exposures were the consolidated exposures for the bank and its securities companies, and thereforethis did not simply re ect the e ect of the Bank of England's guideline on overnight FX exposures that applies to the bank. markets clearly re ects a bank's investment decisions. Randomly generated portfolios are unlikely to be representative and it would be di cult to build stylised books which w ere representative without basing them on actual books.
Lastly, most of our data on the bank's portfolio consisted of xed-income investments in di erent currencies. However, it is important to examine whether VaR analysis performs di erently when applied to portfolios containing equities rather than just xed-income and FX positions. The bank was kind enough to provide us with data on a single additional portfolio, which w e label portfolio 4, which contained equity exposures. The relatively small size of this equity book is typical of what most banks hold.
Return data
The bond returns employed in our study were based on a time series of zero-coupon yield curves calculated by a n i n vestment bank not the one that supplied us with portfolio data. From this, we calculated holding returns for the maturity categories on which w e had portfolio data. For equities, we employed the returns on the French C A C-40, the British FT-All Share, the German DAX, the US S&P Composite and the Japanese Nikkei-225. Including equities and FX positions meant that in total we w ere dealing with 79 di erent sources of risk. All returns were calculated as changes in log prices.
Throughout the analysis we took sterling to be the base currency and employed data from July 1987 to April 1995. Table B shows the annualised sample standard deviations of the daily returns on our 79 di erent rates of return. The gures in Table B suggest that returns on xed-income books are much less volatile than returns on books that include signi cant equity exposure unless the xed-income portfolio includes very long-dated securities. Even holdings heavily weighted towards long-dated bonds will have relatively low a verage durations, and hence are likely to exhibit lower volatilities than portfolios that include equities or FX exposure.
Although the returns data covered the period July 1987 to April 1995, estimates of the VaRs were made only for the period June 1989 to April 1995. Data from the earlier period were used in whole or in part depending on the length of the data window to construct the rst VaR estimate. This meant that it was not possible to compute a VaR estimate for the 1987 equity market crash although the crash did appear in the past data when VaR estimates were calculated using a 24 month window. This explains the high estimates apparent in Chart 1 for portfolio 4 at the start of the estimation period.
Parametric VaR analysis
The rst issue we wish to address in our empirical analysis is the sensitivity of parametric VaR analysis to the precise way in which the volatilities are estimated. The approach t o v olatility estimation typically used in VaR applications is to take a w eighted average of the squared deviation from an estimate of the mean return, using a window of lagged data. Thus, if r t is the holding return at t, a t ypical estimator for 2 = V arr t w ould be: In implementing the VaR models, we w ork out the returns for one-day or rolling ten-day holding periods on a given portfolio and then calculate volatilities, tail probabilities etc, using that single series. This approach yields results that are arithmetically identical to those one would obtain if one estimated a full covariance matrix for n individual asset return series, call it , and then estimated the volatility o f a portfolio with portfolio holdings, a a 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n 0 , b y calculating the quadratic form, a 0 a. The latter approach is that taken by practitioners including JP Morgan in their RiskMetrics system and is clearly more e cient if one has many portfolios for which one wants the Value at Risk on a single date. When a large number of VaR calculations are required for a small number of portfolios on di erent dates, our approach is quicker.
Three choices must be made in implementing the parametric VaR described above, namely i what is an appropriate length for the lagged data`window,' T; ii what weighting scheme should be adopted, 0 ; 1 ; : : : T,1 ; and iii should the mean be estimated using the sample mean, P T,1 j=0 r t,T+j =T , or set to zero as some empirical researchers have advocated. 12 2.4 Forecasting performance and window length Table C shows two w ays of assessing the sensitivity of the VaR results to the choice of T . In the upper block of the table, we show the mean absolute forecast error where we de ne the forecast error at period t as: j j r t , r t j , t j 2 Averaging the absolute forecast errors over the entire sample period yields a measure of the accuracy of the volatility estimates. Standard errors are reported in parentheses under each mean. These are calculated using the technique of Newey and West 1987 and hence are robust to complex patterns of time dependence. The standard errors give a v ery conservative impression of the statistical signi cance of di erences in mean forecast errors since means calculated under di erent assumptions are highly positively correlated, reducing the variability of the average di erence. Hence, we also give the t-statistics for the di erence between each mean absolute forecast error and the other means in the same row of the table. The t-statistics are again calculated using Newey-West techniques.
Note that we tried working with various other measures of forecast accuracy. First, one may de ne the forecast error as r t , r t 2 ,^ 2 t and then employ the sample mean of these absolute di erences. In this case, one is evaluating forecasts of the instantaneous variance rather than the instantaneous standard deviation. Since VaR calculations employ the latter, this is probably not appropriate. Second, we experimented by using root mean squares of the forecast errors instead of simply means. The problem with this approach is that it attributes most weight in the comparison to outliers. We thought it better, therefore, to use means.
In the lower block o f T able C, we provide measures of the degree to which capital requirements based on di erent V aR models do indeed cover losses that occur with a given probability. Assuming normally distributed returns, one may deduce from the time series of estimated volatilities a corresponding series for what we shall call 1 cut-o points meaning the loss which, according to the model, will be exceeded on average 1 of the time. More precisely, the cut-o points may be obtained by i n verting the equation:
r nt a n , 2 ; = 0 :01 3
for on a period-by-period basis. In equation 3, a n is the holding of the nth asset. Throughout our analysis, we shall normalise initial wealth to unity so that P N n=1 a n = 1. Inverting this equation yields:
, , ,1 0:01 4 where is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable. As a measure of the performance of di erent VaR models, the lower panel in Table C shows the proportion of actual portfolio returns that fall below the 1 cut-o points.
As one may see from the upper panel of Table C , the mean absolute forecast errors are relatively insensitive to the length of the data window, though it is true in most cases that a short window yields slightly more accurate forecasts. On the face of it, the insensitivity i s surprising since plots of the forecasts based on long or short windows look quite di erent see Chart 2. Furthermore, comparisons of the forecasting accuracy of di erent V aR techniques applied to individual exchange rate returns included in JP Morgan 1995 suggests that di erent window lengths do make a di erence although not a large one. In fact, the forecastability o f v olatilities and the sensitivity o f t h e forecasts to di erent techniques depend very much on the return series in question. When we repeated the analyses reported in Table C using the return on a single exchange rate, as in JP Morgan 1995, we found distinctly greater di erences between the forecasting performances of di erent V aR techniques.
However, it is important to note that using a di erent window size does signi cantly a ect the tail probabilities shown in the lower part of Table C. In general, the gures in the table show that losses exceed the 1 cut-o points much more than 1 of the time, demonstrating the inaccuracy of the measures of tail probability implied by parametric VaRs based on normal distributions. Hendricks 1996 reaches a similar conclusion in his study of VaR models applied to FX portfolio returns. This is not surprising given the widely documented leptokurtosis of interest rates and stock returns. The results in Table C suggest that a longer data window helps to reduce the tail probability bias, however.
Weighting schemes
As mentioned before, a common procedure is to calculate variance estimates for VaR-type analyses using weighted squared deviations from an estimate of the mean. Rapidly declining weights mean that variance estimates are largely based on the last few observations although information contained in more lagged observations is not totally ignored. The motivation for this approach is the widely recognised fact that nancial market returns are conditionally heteroskedastic.
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A range of more or less complicated techniques has been developed to model this feature of nancial returns. In particular, Generalised Autoregressive and Conditionally Heteroskedastic GARCH models are speci cally designed for this purpose. Most implementations of VaR analysis have taken the simpler approach of estimating variances using the weighted average of squared deviations from the mean described above with weights that decline exponentially as the lag length increases. The weights are thus of the form: Table D shows mean absolute volatility forecast errors obtained using di erent w eighting schemes. The calculations are carried out using daily returns with 24-month windows of lagged data and means xed at zero. Once again, the volatility forecasts for the xed income and FX books are quite insensitive to the precise approach followed although rapidly declining weights = 0 :94 perform somewhat better for all four portfolios, and yield a statistically signi cant improvement in forecast accuracy for portfolio 4. The lower panel of Table D shows the tail probabilities for di erent w eighting schemes. It is apparent that using weighting schemes with rapidly declining weights increases the upward bias in the tail probabilities. As with window length, there appears to be a trade-o in that weighting schemes may improve the degree to which the VaR calculations track time-varying volatilities ie, the mean absolute forecast errors may b e reduced to some small degree, however, the bias in the tail probabilities is exacerbated.
Parametric versus non-parametric VaRs
In this section, we compare the performance of parametric and non-parametric-based VaR models. Since non-parametric VaRs do not yield a time series of volatility forecast errors, we restrict our comparison to the tail probabilities that the two kinds of model produce. Table E shows the results for data window lengths ranging from three to twenty four months. For the parametric approach, ten-day return tail probabilities were calculated by scaling up the one-day V aR estimates by p 10 and then taking the fraction of observations for which the ten-day loss outturns exceed the implied cut-o level. The one-day tail probabilities are calculated as in previous sections. For the non-parametric approach, ten-day return tail probabilities were calculated using ten-day portfolio losses to compute the VaR and then taking the fraction of observations for which the ten-day loss outturns exceed the implied cut-o level. For the one-day tail probabilities, the VaR was computed using one-day portfolio losses and the result compared with the one-day outturns. For both the parametric and the non-parametric approaches, the ten-day return outturns were computed on a rolling basis by summing the log daily returns.
The results in the table suggest that calculating the one-day and ten-day V aR cut-o points from short data windows is inadvisable in that the small sample biases are very substantial. For longer data windows, the non-parametric approach for the one-day returns consistently out-performs the parametric VaR model in that the tail probabilities are matched more accurately. F or the parametric approach, the tail probabilities computed using the di erent lag lengths consistently exceed the 1 level, re ecting the well-known non-normality of nancial returns. Looking at the ten-day returns, for some portfolios, the non-parametric approach appears to perform worse than the parametric VaR estimates. In general, the tail probability gures for ten-day returns serve to underline the statistical problems involved in attempting to deduce ten-day v olatilities directly from estimates of one-day v olatilities.
The inclusion of estimated means
The last exercise we perform to assess the sensitivity o f V aR analyses to di erent assumptions is to calculate mean absolute forecast errors for parametric VaRs i with means estimated from lagged returns, and ii with the means set to zero. Fixing the means at zero might seem an unconventional statistical procedure but the estimation error associated with badly determined mean estimates may reduce the e ciency of the estimated volatilities. Figlewski 1994 makes a similar point in the context of return variance estimation. If the true mean returns are, as seems likely, v ery close to zero, xing them at this level could enhance the forecasts. In fact, the results in Table F show that, for the particular books and return data we employ, the ndings are mixed. The mean absolute forecast errors with means set to zero are in some cases lower and in some higher than in cases in which the means are freely estimated. With one-day returns, the di erences are very small. With portfolio 1, one-day return forecast accuracy is improved in a statistically signi cant w ay but the gain appears economically insigni cant.
2.8`Spike' loss periods
An important question is whether the ability of parametric VaR analysis to`track' the time-series behaviour of volatility enables it to out-perform simulation-based VaRs in predictions of large,`spike' losses in portfolio values. It is possible that even if parametric VaRs do not yield lower mean absolute forecast errors as we s a w a b o ve, they are better at picking out large market movements. This issue is particularly important i f V aR analysis is to be used for regulatory purposes since the primary concern of regulators regarding trading-book risks is that banks will be wiped out by sudden large losses that occur before action could be taken to reduce the riskiness of the bank's portfolio. To examine this issue, we split our sample period into six-month intervals and identify, for each of our portfolios, the day within each period on which the largest loss occurred.
Before comparing the performance of the parametric and simulation-based VaR models, let us examine the composition of the spike portfolio losses. Table G provides detailed break-downs of the constituent parts of each of these large value declines for portfolio 4, which as the reader may recall, contains equity a s w ell as interest rate and FX risk. As is apparent from Table G, bond risk is the most important factor in generating large losses, acting as the dominant factor in eight out of twelve cases. FX risk was the most important factor in the remaining four cases. Table A shows that portfolio 4 contains greater FX exposure than the other portfolios, in particular, a relatively large net United States dollar position.
It is surprising that the equity exposure created no spike losses in the period of our sample. We w ere concerned that this result re ects the fact that large changes in equity v alues tend to be negative, and the largest equity exposure in portfolio 4 is a short position in United States equities. As an experiment, we re-ran the VaR calculations assuming that the equity exposures and the corresponding components of the FX exposures were of opposite sign. Even with this change, none of the spike losses were attributable mainly to equity losses. One may, therefore, conclude that the relatively small size of the equity exposure is enough to make equity risk minimal even though equity returns themselves are much more volatile than those on bond portfolios.
14 Table H shows the capital requirement implied by the VaR estimates minus the actual loss sustained. 15 We term this quantity the capital surplus + or capital short-fall -. As one may see, parametric and simulation-based VaR models perform somewhat di erently. When capital is based on the simulation-based VaR model, the bank has a capital surplus on 16 of the 48 spike loss dates. When the parametric VaR model is used, the bank has a surplus on nine occasions. Whether the capital surplus is positive or negative, on most spike loss dates the simulation-based VaR model implies a larger capital surplus than the parametric VaR.
The implication is that, though it does not exploit the conditional structure of volatility, the simulation-based VaR seems to do a somewhat better job of establishing appropriate capital requirements; Chart 1 illustrates this, using a 24-month window, for each o f t h e portfolios.
Basle alternative approach capital calculations
A last but nevertheless important question is how m uch of a capital cushion the proposed Basle alternative approach w ould deliver for actual books, given not only the 99 con dence level but also the multiplier of three. We look at this issue for our portfolios by comparing the capital requirement that would be generated by one part of the proposed two-stage test, namely three times the 60-day average of the VaRs calculated to cover a ten-day holding period using the parameters laid down by Basle. A bank would be required to hold capital equivalent to the greater of i this amount and ii the VaR for the current book. With a multiplier of three, the rst of these tests will 14 The more`spiky' and volatile nature of equities has been recognisedby regulators, for instance, in the CAD building-block approach. Under the CAD, a single position in a ten-year government bond would carry a capital requirement of 2.4, whereas a single position in an equity index would carry a charge of 8. For a single equity, the charge would be 12.
15
The capital`requirement' is the VaR for the whole book produced using a 99 con dence level. We do not incorporate in this calculation any other aspects of the Basle proposals such as the three-times multiplier.
`bite', unless the bank's current book is abnormally risky.
We compared the ten-day returns which w ould have been secured on our four portfolios during the period July 1989 to April 1995 with the capital requirement based on three times the 60-day a verage of the daily VaRs. The Basle requirement w ould usually be calculated using the 60-day a verage for VaRs for di erent books held on di erent d a ys. In performing the calculations, we used the parametric approach with a 24-month window of past returns data, equal weights, and a zero mean. We calculated the capital requirement implied by m ultipliers of two and two and a half as well as three. None of the portfolios had a single loss outlier losses which exceeded the capital requirement when the multiplier was either two and a half or three. Three of the portfolios had a single marginal loss outlier for a multiplier of two.
The Basle approach to back-testing
The proposed alternative Basle approach e n visages that banks will su er increases in their capital requirements if, over a 250-day period, their VaR models under-predict the number of losses exceeding the 1 cut-o point. Such losses are termed`exceptions'. If a bank's VaR model has generated zero to four exceptions, it is said to be in the Green Zone; if ve to nine, it is in the Yellow Zone; and if there are more than ten exceptions, it is in the Red Zone. The capital requirement for banks whose models are in the Yellow Zone may b e increased by regulators; if they are in the Red Zone, the requirement would almost certainly be increased.
We ran back-tests for all four of our portfolios, comparing the VaR gures calculated for one-day holding periods again, using the parametric approach with the actual return on each book. The number of exceptions for each portfolio over the di erent 250 day periods are set out in Table I . The results vary for di erent portfolios. For three of the six periods, if portfolio 2 were held, the model would generate more than four exceptions. The highest number of exceptions was seven, which occurred twice for portfolio 2 and once for portfolio 4. According to the Basle guidelines, this would normally lead to an increase in the multiplier of 0.65 unless the supervisor could be persuaded that special factors had a ected outcomes. 16 The fact that the model moves from the Green to the Yellow Zone so much from period to period underlines the di culty of distinguishing between good and bad models using samples of a mere 250 observations. However, our results suggest that a grossly inaccurate model would be picked up by such back-testing.
Conclusion
In writing this paper, we h a ve sought to provide practical analysis of help to those contemplating the use of VaR models either for risk measurement within a bank or for regulatory control of bank risk-taking. We h a ve related our results at various points to the recommendations and provisions of the alternative approach of the Basle Accord amendment. A strength of our study is our use of data on the actual trading books of a bank active in a wide range of markets. Judgments of whether one approach dominates another seem to be sensitive to the kind of portfolios held. Studies that analyse VaR modelling on the basis of, for example, a single equity index or FX rate seem to us to be ill-advised, therefore, and it is important t o l o o k a t realistic portfolios.
The main conclusions that emerge from the empirical section of our study are as follows. Simulation-based VaR techniques yield more accurate measures of tail probabilities than parametric VaR models. This arises from the severe non-normality of nancial returns. We are not convinced by the common argument that mismeasurement b y parametric VaRs of the level of tail probabilities does not matter since they correctly rank di erent portfolios. Di erent asset returns will be more or less fat-tailed leading to varying biases.
Parametric VaR analysis tracks the time-series behaviour of volatility better and appears to yield slightly superior volatility forecasts compared to non-parametric, simulation-based techniques though the di erences are generally not statistically signi cant. However, with reasonably well-diversi ed xed-income books, the gains in forecasting accuracy are relatively slight. The parametric VaR models that yield the best forecasts have relatively short window lengths and large weighting factors. But such models are very poor at tting the tails of return distributions and capital requirements based on them tend to be too low.
What are the implications of the proposed amendment to the Basle Accord for banks? The amendment proposes that the value at risk calculated using VaR techniques should be scaled up by a factor of three. With such a high scaling factor, only extremely risky portfolios will ever fail to be covered. Even so, the back-testing provisions proposed by Basle are likely to a ect banks quite signi cantly. Under the proposed amendement, if a bank's VaR model under-predicts the number of large losses, the capital requirement will be adjusted up. A bank holding the portfolios we employ in this study would nd its capital requirements adjusted fairly frequently if it was using the parametric approach. yy Calculated by estimating the VaR from the portfolio losses over ten-day periods and comparing these with the subsequent realised ten-day log returns. 
